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ABSTRACT 
 
Several safety assessment methods have been used to evaluate 
and improve safety in the process industries. Different methods 
have various approaches and may consider safety from different 
aspects and at different levels of the process design. Some 
methods may evaluate chemical and physical safety in the 
processes while some other methods analyse the failure risk 
associated with the processes. According to the importance of 
both aspects of safety, a method that can evaluate them 
concurrently and intervene in the early design phases would be 
of great importance. This paper presents a method with 
mentioned ability which is developed based on the inherent 
safety assessment and probabilistic risk analysis methods. This 
method is implemented on an industrial case using the Petri net 
modelling and safety assessment tool introduced by the authors 
in their previous work.  
  
Keywords:  Petri nets, Inherent safety, Probabilistic risk 
analysis, Indexing system, Process design. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ever-increasing importance of safety in the process 
industries has led to several research studies. Safety and 
reliability levels of a process can be evaluated and improved in 
any step of a plant’s life cycle. Moreover, early safety 
consideration can lead to significant changes in the process 
design and make them safer and prevent hazards and 
catastrophic events from occurring. Investigation to develop 
approaches that can intervene early in the process design is on-
going.  
 
This study reviews safety assessment methods and tools that 
emphasise different aspects of safety and attempts to create a 
combined method which addresses a range of safety issues 
concurrently. A novel tool proposed earlier by the authors is 
used as the implementation tool in this study. Using this tool and 
according to the extent of detail information that the proposed 
method needs as input data it has the potential to be applied in 
the early design phases. 
 
The inherent safety assessment method introduced by Kletz [1] 
and probabilistic risk assessment methods have been described 
briefly in section 2. Section 3 presents the modifications of these 
methodologies and outlines the new method developed by the 
authors. A brief background on different types of Petri nets is 
given in section 4 and the modified version which is used in this 
study as the implementation tool is described. In section 5 
performance of the proposed method is demonstrated through an 
industrial case study followed by a discussion in section 6 and 
the conclusion in the final section. 
         
2. SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODS 
 
The different safety assessment methods reported in the 
literature attempt to evaluate processes from different safety 
aspects and through various approaches. Two main groups are 
evident. The first group of methodologies emphasise the safety 
levels of process conditions both chemically and physically 
while the second group gives more weight to the equipment 
safety characteristics and their reliability levels [2, 3].  
 
Chemical conditions such as toxicity, flammability and 
explosiveness and physical conditions such as pressure and 
temperature are considered as main factors influencing safety of 
a process in the first group. Inherent safety assessment is an 
example of this group [4, 5].  
 
The second group accounts for the reliability levels of the 
equipment to start working or continue to work in different 
situations. Probabilistic risk assessment, fault tree analysis, 
failure mode and effect analysis, and layer of protection analysis 
come under this category [6, 7]. 
 
In this study one well developed technique from each group has 
been chosen for more detailed investigation based on their 
capability to intervene in the early stages of design. Inherent 
safety assessment can be implemented at any phase of design by 
using chemical and physical information of a process available 
at that particular level. Probabilistic risk assessment is also 
another method which can be employed early during design 
process using experts’ opinions and available data bases. These 
two methods are described briefly as follows. 
 
Inherent safety assessment – this method is based on the idea of 
making a process safer through fundamental modifications. This 
approach attempts to make safety as a permanent and pro-active 
characteristic of the processes rather than creating safety through 
add-on features and control procedures. The key principles of 
this method are: simplification to use simpler processes; 
minimization to reduce the amount of hazardous materials; 
attenuation to replace hazardous materials with non-hazardous 
alternatives; and finally, moderation to diminish the impacts of 
hazardous materials by reducing the amount of these materials 
available in the processes [1, 4]. Considering these principles 
during process design stages ensures inherently safer processes. 
On the other hand, in evaluation of safety in an existing process 
the extent of application of each of these keywords can give a 
measure of the inherent safety level of that process. Hence, by 
  
using this method, safety assessment is able to appropriately 
intervene into process design from the initial design stages [8]. 
      
The qualitative concepts applied in this approach may be 
quantified using a proper indexing system. Many researches 
have been under taken and a number of well designed index 
based systems have been developed to serve this purpose. These 
include Prototype safety index, Inherent safety index, Expert 
system and Integrated inherent safety index [4, 8]. Integrated 
inherent safety index system (I2SI) has been adapted in this 
study and described as follows. 
   
This indexing system introduces one main safety index which 
comprises some sub-indices that account for process chemical 
and physical safety characteristics. Final integrated inherent 
safety index (I2SI) indicates the potential applicability of the 
inherent safety keywords to the process. This index is a ratio of 
inherent safety potential index over the hazard index which is 
calculated for each unit operation/equipment individually (Eq.1). 
Greater than unity index value indicates the positive respond to 
the inherent safety principles. The bigger the index the safer the 
unit operation/equipment. A less than unity I2SI indicates that 
the unit operation/equipment does not respond to the inherent 
safety guidelines which is a weakness of the process route 
containing that unit operation/equipment [8, 9]. These indices 
are explained briefly as follows: 
 
- Hazard index (HI) – this index is calculated for the basic 
route and remains the same for all other options (Eq.2). 
HI is the ratio of damage index (DI) over the process and 
hazard control index (PHCI). Damage index is a function 
of fire and explosion, acute toxicity, chronic toxicity and 
environmental damage indices. The process and hazard 
control index takes into account existing and required 
add-on control measures regarding pressure, temperature, 
flow, level, concentration, inert venting, blastwall, fire 
resistance wall, sprinkler system and forced dilution.  
- Inherent safety potential index (ISPI) – shows the 
applicability of each guide word to the process as a 
function of two other sub-indices (Eq.3): The inherent 
safety index which measures the efficiency of each 
guideword in the process; and process and hazard control 
index which is described earlier.   
 
To calculate the total I2SI of a production route Eq.4 is 
suggested by Khan and Amyotte [8]. 
 
I2SI = ISPI/HI                                                                  (Eq.1) 
HI = DI/PHCI                                                                  (Eq.2) 
ISPI = ISI/PHCI                                                               (Eq.3) 
I2SIsystem = (Π I2SIi)
1/2                                                     (Eq.4) 
where i =1…n indicates the unit operation/equipment                 
     
Probabilistic risk assessment – this method is based on the 
potential major scenarios with adverse impacts on the safety of 
a system. These hazardous scenarios need to be investigated 
and the probability of their occurrence and magnitude of their 
consequences should be identified for each unit operation and 
piece of equipment. The probability of occurrence of each 
failure event may be calculated using released scenarios and 
probability data of related basic events. Severity of the 
consequences  may be measured by considering possible loss 
of life and property damage and the degradation of the 
environment caused by the failure event [2]. Different 
resources may be used to obtain required information for 
risk/safety calculation such as experts’ opinions, statistical 
data and experimental results. Risk/safety level can be  
quantified using the Bayesian probability theory [10].  
 
A simple two term equation may be used to calculate the risk 
factor related to each unit operation/piece of equipment (Eq.5). 
Total risk associated with each process option is given through 
summation of risk factors of all units included in that option 
(Eq.6) [11].  
 
Risk = failure rate × consequences                                  (Eq.5) 
Total risk = ∑ Risk i                                                         (Eq.6)  
 where  i=0, …, n   indicates the unit operation/equipment 
            
3. METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
 
According to the significant impacts of both groups of factors on 
improving the safety level of a process, methodologies that have 
the ability to evaluate these factors concurrently are of great 
importance. In this study, two safety evaluation methodologies 
described earlier have been adapted to develop a new combined 
method addressing both aspects of safety.   
  
To assess the inherent safety, the I2SI is calculated for each unit 
operation/equipment existing in a production route as mentioned 
above: however, a new approach is suggested for calculation of 
the total I2SI of the system. Application of Eq. (4) in different 
case studies has shown the sensitivity of this method to the 
number of unit operations/equipment which means the greater 
number of unit operations/equipment results in a higher total 
I2SI for that system while it does not directly influence the 
safety level of the system. Moreover, using the square root in 
this formula intensifies the impact of the larger I2SI available in 
a system on the total value of the I2SI.  
 
To overcome these weaknesses, it is suggested that geometric 
mean [12] of all I2SI values related to all unit 
operations/equipment in a production route is used instead of Eq. 
(4). It gives the average I2SI in a process option (Eq.7). 
 
Average I2SIroute = (Π I2SIi)
1/n                                             (Eq.7)   
 where i = 1…n indicates the unit operation/equipment and n is 
the total number of unit operations/equipment   
               
Application of a proper averaging method would diminish the 
impact of the number of elements contributing in a system on 
the final value calculated for that system. Since the geometric 
mean is usually used in situations in which the nature of each 
element is originally based on the productivity, it can be a 
suitable option for calculation of the average I2SI of a process 
option. In addition, using the nth  root leads to levelling the 
weight of all n elements of the system on the calculated average 
factor. 
   
This average inherent safety factor is combined with an average 
risk factor to give a unique index representing the safety level of 
a process option considering both chemical and physical safety 
and reliability of that process.  
 
Reliability and probability of failure associated with each unit 
operation/equipment in the production route is calculated using 
the probabilistic risk assessment method and is based on the 
available data from different sources and the experts’ opinions. 
In order to obtain a dimensionless risk factor the ratio of failure 
rate of a unit operation/equipment to the total possible failure 
rates of all unit operations/equipment is considered as the failure 
probability. The magnitude of consequences in each case of 
  
failure is converted into a numeric index using Table 1. 
Decisions about the proper index should be made based on 
expert opinion. The total risk factor needs to be compatible with 
the inherent safety factor described earlier in order to be 
combined with that to form a new index. Hence, instead of using 
Eq. (6) to calculate the total risk of a process the average risk 
associated with that process can be used. According to the 
productivity nature of the risk factor, again the geometric mean 
can be a suitable option (Eq.8). 
 
Table 1. Guideline to decide magnitude of consequence of failure 
Description  index Description  index 
Extremely high 10 Reasonable 5 
Very high 9 Low 4 
Not greatly high but noticeable 8 Significantly Low 3 
Noticeable 7 Ignorable 1…2 
Moderately noticeable 6   
 
Average riskroute = (Π riski)
1/n                                              (Eq.8)  
where i = 1…n indicates the unit operation/equipment and n is 
the total number of unit operations/equipment   
               
Finally, the average risk factor representing lack of safety in a 
system can be extracted from the average inherent safety factor 
which shows the degree of safeness of that system (Eq.9). The 
result is a safety factor in which both major groups of safety 
evaluation criterion have been considered. This new safety index 
is called the average safety index in this study. 
 
Average safety indexroute = Average I2SIroute – Average riskroute                                                                          
(Eq.9)  
 
The other index which is used in this method to assist decision-
making process is the total number of the unit 
operations/equipment not responding to the inherent safety 
keywords (with I2SI less than unity) which is called the penalty 
factor in this study. Greater penalty factor shows safer process 
option. 
 
One of the major advantages of the proposed method is that the 
input data which is used to calculate the final safety factor 
introduced in this method does not need to be highly detailed. 
Hence, this method can be appropriately applied during the 
preliminary design phases. It would provide designers with a 
safety decision-making factor which is of great importance for 
surviving in today’s extremely competitive market and can be 
used in conjunction with the other important factors, such as cost 
factors to compare different production alternatives and choose 
the optimal option. The simple concept of this method is the 
other strength which makes it easy to understand and use in the 
different industries and different situations.  
  
This safety evaluation method needs to be implemented via a 
suitable tool. An appropriate tool has been developed by the 
authors [13] which is introduced briefly in the following section.   
 
4. SAFETY EVALUATION TOOL 
 
To implement safety assessment during any phase of the process 
design a reliable tool is required. These methods and tools may 
differ from one stage of design to another stage depending on 
the specific requirements of each stage and the type of data 
available at that stage. Some methods can be applied after 
process design completion as they need the process information 
to an extent which can be provided only when all steps of design 
have been carried out. While some other methods are suitable to 
be used  earlier in the design stages as they do not need very 
specific information [2, 14]. Layer of protection method and 
inherent safety are two examples of these categories, 
respectively.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the main concern of this study is to 
integrate safety assessment into the early design stages. To serve 
this purpose the implementation tool has to be able to model 
process in the conceptual design decision-making phase. In 
order to carry out safety assessment simultaneously with process 
design it needs to have the capability of processing different 
types of information at the same time. Moreover, an effective 
tool has to be easy to understand and use, be able to generate the 
reliable results and be flexible enough to be used in the different 
situations [15]. 
  
Several researches show that the Petri net modelling tool is a 
suitable option which can meet these requirements. Petri net is 
a graphical-mathematical modelling tool with significant 
flexibility so that it is able to model different systems. Being 
graphic based, this modelling tool has great potential to be 
easily understood and applied via different groups of 
specialists and experts as a common modelling language. In 
addition, Petri net has crucial ability and flexibility in process 
modelling and carrying out simultaneous safety evaluation and 
calculation. This tool has been adapted by the authors in their 
previous work as an appropriate tool for process modelling 
and concurrent safety calculations [13]. 
 
In general, Petri net is a directed, bipartite five-tuple; 
PN = (P,T,F,W,M0) where 
P = {p1, p2, …, pm} is a finite set of places shown as circles. 
T = {t1, t2, …, tn} is a finite set of transitions represented by 
bars. 
F  ∈ (P×T) U (T×P) is a set of arcs connecting places to 
transitions and vice versa. 
W: F → {1, 2, 3, …} is a weighting function. Weight may be 
defined for any type of nodes to introduce specific attributes 
related to that node. 
M0: P → {0, 1, 2, …} is the initial marking defining the 
number of tokens (represented as dots inside places). 
 
If all required resources are available, a transition is called 
enabled transition. An enabled transition changes to a fired 
transition if the tokens from its input places are removed into 
the output places [16]. 
 
Various types of the Petri nets have been developed with 
different characteristics and abilities to be applied in the 
different situations. Place weighted Petri net and Stochastic 
Petri net are two types of Petri nets which showed great 
compatibility with the proposed safety assessment methods. A 
combination of these two types has been used in this study.  
 
In place weighted Petri net, places represent unit 
operations/equipment, transitions show start and end of 
operations and events, tokens are raw materials, semi-finished 
  
or final products and arcs illustrate process flow. Safety and 
risk information associated with each part of the process are 
allocated  as weight factors into the related places.  
 
Stochastic Petri net is an extended version of the original Petri 
net in which random firing time is associated with each 
transition. It has the ability to model the stochastic processes 
and describe the future state of a system based on the provided 
stochastic data. The random time spent in each state before 
firing the next transition is determined by the distribution 
function defined for each transition. Stochastic Petri nets have 
been used widely in performance evaluation, identifying 
bottleneck work station, verifying timing constraints, 
obtaining production rate, average delay, resource utilization, 
and reliability measures [17-20]. 
 
In this study, stochastic behaviour is used to address the 
probability of failure of each unit operation/equipment in a 
production route. Firing time or firing delay of each transition 
in stochastic Petri net can be replaced with the firing 
probability or on the other hand the probability of failure to 
fire. Firing probability of transitions shows the probability of 
equipment running properly or failure to run when needed. 
This probability can be based on the predefined probability 
distribution function. If a density function is used as the risk 
function, a discrete risk oriented system such as stochastic risk 
manufacturing system can be described. The concept of the 
total delay in a production system simulated with a stochastic 
timed-Petri net is equivalent to the total risk associated with 
the production route modelled with the risk based stochastic 
Petri net. This risk is accumulated from the beginning of the 
simulation.  
 
These two types of Petri nets are used together to take into 
account both inherent safety characteristics of the processes 
and probabilistic behaviour of the unit operations/equipment in 
terms of reliability and failure. Inherent safety factors of each 
unit operation/equipment are considered as weight factors of 
related place, while failure probability data is defined as firing 
distribution function related to each transition showing the 
start of operation of each unit operation/equipment. 
 
Using the described Petri net modelling tool all process 
alternatives come together and form a super-net model. This 
super-net is divided into some sub-nets based on similarities 
and differences of contributing production routes. Similar unit 
operations or groups of similar unit operations form the 
common sub-nets while different parts of processing routes are 
represented by the individual sub-nets.     
 
Some significant achievements of the proposed tool are: 
 
- Flexibility of implementing different safety evaluation 
methods. 
- Minor complexity level to be learned and applied. 
- Simultaneous process modelling and safety assessment. 
- Providing comparative base for decision-making. 
- And above all, providing the opportunity of automatic 
generation of all possible production alternatives by 
creating an integrated super-net [13]. 
  
5. CASE STUDY 
 
In order to demonstrate the performance of the proposed safety 
evaluation methodology and tool, an industrial case is 
investigated. The claimed ability of the automatic generation of 
all possible production routes is shown through including three 
different production routes as base cases in a super-net model. 
All other possible combinations are obtained using the proposed 
Petri net tool. The developed methodology provides designers 
with a safety index associated with each option as a decision-
making factor.  
  
Gold mining is one of the major industries around the world. 
From the various technologies applied to recover gold ore into 
gold bullion, three methods are chosen as the basic routes in this 
study: carbon oxidation (Fig.1), roasting (Fig.2) and bio 
oxidation (Fig.3). These production routes are described briefly 
as follows: 
 
Carbon oxidation - this method uses carbon in oxidation process 
for gold recovery and contains the following steps: crushing, 
grinding, froth floatation, carbon oxidation, carbon in 
leach/carbon in pulp, stripping, electrowinning and smelting 
[21]. 
 
Roasting – this method applies roasting technology in gold 
recovery phase and includes different steps: crushing, grinding, 
froth floatation, roasting, carbon in leach, elution, 
electrowinning and smelting [22, 23].   
 
Bio oxidation – bacterial oxidation is used in gold recovery step 
in this method while the other steps are: crushing, grinding, bio 
oxidation, clarifying, vacuum de-gassing, zinc dusting and 
smelting [24]. 
 
Some unit operations are common in two or all three process 
options while each option contains some unique steps.  These 
similarities and differences form the basis of the super-net model 
which includes common and individual sub-nets. The developed 
Petri net super-net model and associated sub-nets are illustrated 
in Fig. (4) , the description of the sub-nets is given in Table 2. 
The place numbers parallel to unit operations/equipment are 
shown in Figs. (1) to (3).   
 
This Petri net model is implemented in the Visual studio 
environment using the C++ codes and resulted in the generation 
of twelve different production routes which illustrate all possible 
combinations. The proposed safety evaluation method described 
earlier is applied to assess the safety and reliability level of each 
generated process alternative. All results are presented in Table 
3 and are discussed in the following section. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the application of the proposed 
safety and risk assessment method in this study. The application 
of the proposed methodology and Petri net tool has resulted in 
generation  of twelve routes with the final safety factors between  
0.40  and  0.55, and the total numbers of not responding unit 
operations/equipment, penalty factors, between 8 and 13. Routes 
number  8  and 12  prove to be the safest options in this method 
with the final safety factors and penalty factors of (0.55, 10)  and 
(0.54, 8), respectively. The final safety factor for route  8  is 
slightly higher than the final safety index of route 12:  however, 
route 12  contains the smallest number of not responding unit 
operations/equipment to the inherent safety keywords.  
 
The safety assessment methodology and tool proposed in this 
paper provide designers with the opportunity to generate all 
possible production alternatives based on the similarities and 
differences between some initial base cases. Furthermore, 
  
several quantitative and qualitative safety characteristics of all 
these generated production routes are evaluated and converted 
into a pair of quantitative factors for each option simultaneously 
with the route generation process. It is shown that these 
combined methodology and applied tool would result in easier, 
faster and more accurate decision-making process. In addition, 
automatic route generation and safety calculations in this method 
minimize the need for human involvement and therefore human 
errors during the design process.   
  
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has proposed a new safety assessment methodology 
based on two well known methodologies: the inherent safety 
assessment and the probabilistic risk analysis. Some important 
modifications have been made to these methods and the 
modified methods have been combined to create a new approach 
which can address safety issues related to the chemical and 
physical process conditions and risk of failure associated with 
the unit operations/equipment in the process options. This 
approach automatically generates all possible production options 
and calculates two factors for each route concurrently. One of 
these factors shows the safety level, while the other one gives 
the total number of unit operations/equipment not responding to 
the inherent safety principles in each route. These factors may be 
used as the appropriate safety indicators along with the other 
decision-making factors to enhance the decision-making process 
and choose the optimal production route. 
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Fig.1  Carbon oxidation method [21]. 
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Fig.2  Roasting method [22]. 
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Fig.4  Super-net model 
  
 
Table 2. Definition of sub-nets included in super-net model 
Sub-net Place(s) Sub-net Place(s) 
Sub-net 1 P1, P2 Sub-net 6 P16, P17, P18, P19, P20, P21, P22, P23, P24 
Sub-net 2 P3, P4 Sub-net 7 P25, P26, P27, P28, P29, P30, P31, P32 
Sub-net 3 P6, P7, P8 Sub-net 8 P33, P34, P35, P36, P37, P38, P43, P44 
Sub-net 4 P10, P11 Sub-net 9 P41, P42 
Sub-net 5 P12, P13   
 
Table 3. Summary of results using average safety method 
Route number Route1 Route2 Route3 Route4 Route5 Route6 
Average safety index 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.49 
Penalty factor 11 10 10 9 13 12 
Route number Route7 Route8 Route9 Route10 Route11 Route12 
Average safety index 0.52 0.55 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.54 
Penalty factor 11 10 11 10 9 8 
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